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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T
·of the

STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM G. ERICKSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8938

HELEN W. ERICKSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
The plaintiff and defendant were divorced on the
lOth day of February, 1954 (R. 7), the plaintiff being
granted the divorce, and plaintiff being ordered to pay
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month. The
divorce was not contested and was procured subsequent
to the filing of an appearance, consent and waiver by the
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defendant acknowledging receipt of a copy of the complaint (R. 3). The conclusions of law (R. 5) and the
decree (R. 6) ordered child support as set forth in the
complaint, indicating that the court in its discretion
adopted the sum agreed to by the parties by means of
allegations of the complaint and the appearance, consent and waiver, after having heard th~ evidence for the
divorce.
On the 23rd day of March, 1956, defendant had
plaintiff ordered into court to show cause why, among
other things, he should not be required to pay defendant
the sum of $350.00 per month as child support (R. 11).
The defendant appeared as ordered before the Honorable
.:\Iaurice Harding sitting as a Third District Judge.
Judge Harding granted attorney's fees, judgment on
an automobile, and modified the decree allowing the
defendant to ren1ove the children from the state, but did
not allow the requested increase in support money or any
part of the amount.
On June 2, 1958, defendant brought an order to show
cause requesting n1odifieation of the decree to increase
support n1oney from $150.00 to $400.00 per month, alleging in her petition that the su1n of $400.00 \nls reasonably Jw<·e~sar~T to support tl1e children and alleging on
:infonnation and belief that the plaintiff's incmne had
substantially inen·a~ed since the divorce and that the
plaintiff is now earning $~0,000.00 per year (R. 1±).
This was the only- change of circun1stanees alleged. The
order ca1ne on for hearing before the Honorable Martin
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M. Larson on the 11th day of June, 1958. Judge Larson
allowed the testimony to go back to the time of divorce,
despite the intervening order to show cause why support
should not be increased which was heard before Judge
Harding on March 3, 1956.
On the 23rd day of June, 1958, the court entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 60-61) and
order (R. 63) granting the defendant a 50% increase in
child support and $125.00 attorney's fees. On June 26,
1958, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. The motion
was heard by the court and was denied by order filed
on the 16th day of July, 1958. Plaintiff duly appealed
from the order modifying the decree and from the denia]
of the motion for new trial.
STATEMENT OF F kCTS
The plaintiff is the father and defendant is the
mother of Pamela and William G. Erickson, Jr., 11¥2
and 8 years of age, respectively (R. 25). William G.
Erickson, Jr. is referred to in the transcript as Eric.
The parties have been divorced since February 10, 1954.
The children have been in the custody of the defendant
during the interim period. The court at the time of the
divorce ordered support money payments in the sum of
$150.00 per month, or $75.00 per child. With respect to
the order to show cause appealed from, the defendant
testified as follows:
That she presently resides in Kansas City, Missouri;
that she has been married since the divorce from the
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plaintiff, and that her husband died on October 11, 1957
(R. 25) ; that she is paying $160.00 for an apartment;
milk and groceries for the two children and herself run
between $150.00 and $160.00 per month (R. 26), that
groceries are high because she doesn't have time to shop;
that lights run $17.00, gas $6.00, and telephone $9.00, and
that $31.00 of the $32.00 for utilities would be the children's share (R. 27). Clothes for the children run $20.00
per month for each child (R. 27), cleaning for the children runs $5.00 per month. Hospitalization insurance
runs $8.00 per month, lunches for the children run $12.00
per month, cosmetics for the 11% year old girl, $5.00 per
month (R. 28), and miscellaneous entertainment runs
$20.00 per month. Their allowance is $6.00 per month,
and the total is $314.50 per month for the support of the
children (R. 26). It will probably cost $500.00 to have
the children's teeth straightened (R. 29). Plaintiff has
paid the $150.00 per month decreed by the court with
the exception of one month in 1957 when he had the children (R. 30). Defendant makes $250.00 per month as
secretary for a hotel manager, 1V"ith the promise of a
substantial increase when she learns to take shorthand.
In February, 1954, at the tiine of the divorce, the
parties were paying $150.00 for a house for plaintiff,
defendant, and the two children; food for the four persons was $125.00 per month; she didn't lmow the a1nount
of doctor bills; Pamela has an illness, a heart murn1er,
that she has had since she was a baby (R. 34).
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The plaintiff testified as follows:
That he is an 1\ti.D. surgeon; he has been practicing
since 1952; and he was a resident in a hospital from 1950
to 1952 (R. 36); he brought, at the court's order, income
tax returns from 1953 to 1957, inclusive. The returns
were prepared by accountants and accurate to the best
of his knowledge with the exception of 1954 when there
was a $500.00 tax deficiency which he has subsequently
been paying to the government. The returns were offered
and entered in evidence as Exhibit P-4 without objection.
R. 39 through 40 and R. 45 and R. 46 are a series
of conclusions and contradictions of the plaintiff regarding interpretation of the income tax returns (Exhibit 4)
which were prepared by accountants. They are entered
in evidence and constitute the best evidence of what they
contain.
The plaintiff works for American Smelting and Refining, which employment constitutes $6,000.00 per year
of his income. Kennecott Copper Company has purchased
American Smelting and Refining and the plaintiff will
no longer be employed by them after the first of the year,
or nine months from the date of the hearing. This will
cause a $6,000.00 decrease in income, together with an
increase in office expenses (R. 47-48). The plaintiff has
remarried and ihas three children by this marriage,
Chuck, 11% years of age, an adopted child, and two
natural children, Haze, 2% years, and Amy Joe, eighteen
months (R. 49). The child Haze has a visual defect which
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will require special care and training and increased expenses. The plaintiff has substantial obligations still
existing from his marriage to the defendant and their
divorce, on which he is presently making payments totaling $176.00 per month (R. 51). Plaintiff has $788.43 of
listed current monthly expenses, including $176.00 per
month on obligations from his marriage to the defendant, $150.00 child support and a $90.00 payment on an
automobile that is necessary to his profession and earning ability, thus leaving $144.00 per month for food,
clothing, medical expenses, and entertainment for a
family of five persons (R. 51-53).
Plaintiff has been on no trips other than one trip
with Pamela and Eric when he went to the Middle West
to get them in the summer of 1957, and with the exception of one party for business associates in 1956, has
done no entertaining (R. 53). His take-home income
after taxes and deductions is approximately the same
as in 1954, the year of the divorce (R. 54).
The $150.00 support money was arrived at by stipulation of the parties and approved by the trial court (R.
54).
Plaintiff belonged to a golf club during his marriage
to the defendant but has had to give up 1nembership
as he couldn't afford it.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
HAS BEEN SHOWN SINCE THE TIME OF THE HEARING
BEFORE JUDGE HARDING IN 1956 OR SINCE THE TIME
OF THE DIVORCE IN 1954 TO WARRANT AN INCREASE
IN CHILD SUPPORT.
II.
THAT NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT NOR THE
·CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOW A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE MODIFICATION MADE IN
THE DECREE.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT MONEY, AND
ALLOWING THE COURT'S ORDER TO STAND WOULD BE
GROSSLY INEQUITABLE.

ARGUMENT
I.
NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTAN·CES
HAS BEEN SHOWN SINCE THE TIME OF THE HEARING
BEFORE JUDGE HARDING IN 1956 OR SINCE THE TIME
OF THE DIVORCE IN 1954 TO WARRANT AN INCREASE
IN CHILD SUPPORT.

The only change of circumstances alleged by the
defendant in her petition was a substantial increase in
earnings of the plaintiff since the divorce, the allegation
being on information and belief that the plaintiff is now
earning $20,000.00 per year (R. 14). The income tax
records of the plaintiff (Exhibit 4) are the only competent evidence as to this allegation, and show the following:
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Year

1954
1955
1956
1957

.Adjusted Gross Income
----------~-------------$9 ,534.82

------------------------10,135.75
_______________________ 11,596.99
________________________11,325.06

Taxable Income

$6,581.34
5,284.08
6,217.72
4,495.22

The year of the divorce was 1954.
The plaintiff testified that his take-home pay after
taxes and deductions was approximately the same in 1957
as in 1954, at the time of the divorce (R. 54). True, the
plaintiff has acquired additional responsibilities during
the intervening years, but they were acquired during a
period when the defendant had also remarried and
while the plaintiff was abiding fully with the order of
the court with regard to the support of the children that
are issue of the 1narriage between the parties.
\V e contend that the husband in a divorce suit has
the same right to build a new life and famil~~ as does
the wife, and his duty to the children of the dissolved
marriage is equal to but not in excess of his duty to a
subsequent family.
The plaintiff faithfully abided by the orders of the
court with respect to child support ''ith the exception
of one month when he had the clrildren in his custody,
and his c Iumges of circu1nstances frmn 195± to 1956 were
such tit at Judge I1arding in the hearing of l\{arch 3, 1956
(R. 12) did not see fit to grant an increase in child support requested by that order to show cause (R. 10). The
income tax returns entered in evidence show a decrease
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in gross income between the hearing before Judge Harding and the June 11, 1958 hearing before Judge Larson,
rather than showing an increase.
The plaintiff has listed his current monthly expenses
including $176.00 in obligations still being paid off from
the first marriage, together with $150.00 child support
per month and a $90.00 automobile payment on a car
necessary to his business. None of the other listed expenses can be said to be for luxuries or of a frivolous
nature, but after payment, the plaintiff's present family
of five has less for food, clothing, and entertainment
than the defendant testified she pays for groceries per
month.
The defendant's own testimony shows that she is
presently making $250.00 per month, or $3,000.00 per
year, where at the time of the divorce she was not workIng.
Also, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the
plaintiff will lose $6,000.00 per year by termination of
his employment with American Smelting and Refining
Company on or about the first of the year, and before
his existing obligations are liquidated. This court has
repeatedly held "A divorce decree may not be modified unlestS
it is alleged, proved, and trial court finds that
circumstances on which it was based have substantially changed." Gale v. Gale, 63 U. 261, 253
P. 2d 986; Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47
P. 2d 419; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 U. 261, 236
P. 457.
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"To entitle either party to modification of
alimony or support provision of a decree of divorce, such party must plead and prove a change
of circumstances such as to require in fairness
and equity a change in terms of decree." Osmos
v. Osmos, 198 P. 2d 233, citing other cases.
In Hampton v. Hampton, cited supra, at page 420
this court held :
"It is well settled in this court that in order
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the
moving party must allege and prove changed
conditions arising since the entry of the decree
which require, under rules of equity and justice,
a change in the decree. Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63
Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65
Utah 261, 236 P. 457. It is likewise well settled
in this state that where the appeal is on a question of the propriety of the judgment for alimony
this court is required to review the evidence in the
nature of a trial de novo on the record and thl3
appellant is entitled to the judgment of tlris court
as well as the trial court on this question. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. (2d) 364:
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214, and
cases therein cited.
"The above cases, and cases therein cited,
likewise establish the rules that it is not necessary
for this court to find a gross abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court before modifying
the judgment as to alilnony, and that no general
rule as to the amount of alimony can be laid down
to follow in all cases, but the decree in each case
must be determined upon the facts, the conditions,
and circumstances of the parties in each particular case, and that if, upon exan1ination of the
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record, this court is convinced that the award
in the trial court is inequitable and unjust, then
this court should direct such decree as it finds
to be just and equitable. The amount of alimony
is measured by the wife's needs and requirements
considering her station in life and upon the husband's ability to pay."
In the Hampton case as in the present case, the
father of the child had married again and had additional
dependents requiring his support. ·
II.
THAT NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT NOR THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOW A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE MODIFICATION MADE IN
THE DECREE.

The only finding that shows a material change from
the findings at the time of the original decree is Finding
No. 2 (R. 60) showing an increase in the age of the children.
The original findings do not show the earning power
of the plaintiff, but the amount of child support stipulated to by the parties (R. 54) was the amount set forth
in the amended complaint (R. 1). Defendant acknowledged receipt of a copy of the complaint in her appearance and waiver (R. 3), and the court in its Conclusions
of Law and Decree adopted that amount after hearing
the testimony for the divorce.
The court must also take into account the absence
of findings and conclusions in the order signed by Judge
Harding on the 6th day of April, 1956 (R. 12). In the
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order to show cause from which that order arose, the
defendant requested an increase in child support from
$150.00 to $350.00 per month which, upon plaintiff's appearing and showing cause, was not granted. The plaintiff's income has decreased rather than increased since
the time of that hearing.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING AN INCREASE IN SUPPORT MONEY, AND
ALLOWING THE COURT'S ORDER TO STAND WOULD BE
GROSSLY INEQUITABLE.

In considering all the evidence it would appear that
the defendant is now spending for an apartment for
herself and the two children $192.00 per month, consisting of $160.00 per month rent and $32.00 utilities (R.
26-27), as compared to the $150.00 rental for the family
of four at the time of the divorce (R. 32), and plaintiff's
$126.00 house payments plus utilities for his present
family of five. The defendant testified she spends
$150.00 to $160.00 per month for food and milk, plus
$20.00 per month per child for clothes, while the plaintiff
has $144.00 per month for food, clothing and entertainment for a family of five, and the parties and their
children before the divorce subsisted on $125.00 per
month.
It would appear that the defendant has acquired
extremely expensive tastes, which might well account
for a good portion of the existing indebtedness being
paid off by the plaintiff. The increase granted b~T the
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trial court is in the sum of $75.00 per month, or $900.00
per year, and amounts to well over 50% of the increase
in plaintiff's adjusted gross income between 1954 and
1957, and over 100% of the taxable increase of the plaintiff during those years. The income tax forms entered
in evidence by the plaintiff show there was an actual
decrease in taxible income for the year 1957 in comparison with any of the prior years. While it is true that
the plaintiff has additional exemptions that he did not
have in 1954, these exemptions were acquired during a
period when the plaintiff was complying fully with the
court's child support decree, and while the plaintiff's
adjusted gross income is substantially as found by the
court in Finding No. 5, it is only slightly increased from
the time of the divorce, and his change of circumstances
with regard to responsibilities and liabilities shows a
more serious financial condition in 1958 than the evidence shows in 1954. We refer again to the Hampton
case wherein the court holds in 47 P. 2d, page 421:
"It may be conceded that $50 per month is
necessary for the support of the plaintiff and
their minor child, but the more difficult question
is whether the defendant is able to pay this
amount of alimony under his present circunlstances. We are convinced that the changed conditions appearing in the record require a reduction in the amount of alimony as fixed by the trial
court, which we feel is more than the defendant
is able to pay, and at the same time maintain hi3
station in life as a teacher and support his present
family; and, accordingly, we have determined that
the amount should be reduced to $45 per month."
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In the present case, the pleadings show that the
defendant entered her appearance and waiver with full
knowledge of the amount of child support agreed upon
by the parties and of her situation at that time. The
court concluded in its Conclusions of Law that the plaintiff should pay to defendant for the support of the children $150.00, and made that order in the decree. VvTe
do not contend that the decree of the court may not be
modified, but contend that there is no showing, let alone
pleading, of a substantial and permanent change in circumstances justifying any increase whatsoever, but the
trial court ordered a 50% increase in child support. The
change shown by the evidence indicates a much greater
financial responsibility on the shoulders of the plaintiff
with little increase in earnings from 1954 through 1956,
and an actual decrease between 1956 and 1957. On the
other hand, the testimony of the defendant indicates
that she has an income of $3,000.00 per year, where she
had no income at the time of the divorce. Her testimony
also shows that her main financial change as far as the
children go is an existence on a higher standard of living
when judged by monetary expenditures than that which
plaintiff is now living and considerably higher than the
Erickson family was living at the time of the divorce.
In fact, it shows a standard of living far beyond the
means of the $250.00 per n1onth secretary to a hotel
manager. The expenses for which the plaintiff is liable
are fully set out in the incOine tax returns, and his testimony indicates a financial situation despite earnin~
capacity which makes the payment of $150.00 per month
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as child support difficult, and the payment of $225.00
as ordered by the court impossible.
SUM11ARY

Plaintiff contends that the pleadings do not allege,
that evidence considered as a whole does not show, and
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to support the decree by Judge Larson substantially increasing payments of child support. We readily
agree that on the scale which the defendant is attempting
to live the $75.00 per month per child is an inadequate
amount. However, on the other hand, the status of the
doctor's financial affairs and present responsibilities
make it inequitable if not impossible for him to pay an
increased amount of child support at this time, especially
in view of the pending loss of $6,000.00 salary per year,
together with a considerable part of office and personnel
expenses now furnished by the American Smelting and
Refining Company. True, the doctor over a period of
years can possibly build his income back to its present
level and the 1954 level through private practice, but he
is placed in an even worse financial condition by being
forced to comply with the order appealed from. He will
be under an extreme handicap in maintaining his professional reputation and standing in building his income
to a point where an increase over and above the $150.00
ordered at the time of the divorce is justified and proper.
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It seems to be the general public opinion that the
fact that a person is an M.D. puts them in a financial
class by themselves. The entire record, including the
testimony of the income tax return exhibits, shows that
the plaintiff in this matter is in bad financial straits
despite an annual income above average, before business
expenses and pre-existing personal expenses not entirely
attributable to the plaintiff are considered, which makes
the money available for actually existing insufficient to
make the decree of the trial court equitable.
We sincerely request that the court in its capacity
to review the facts as well as the law in equitable matters
of this type, reverse the decision of the lower court, and
order the original child support payments of $150.00 per
month or $75.00 per child reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
SU~fNER

J. HATCH

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant

409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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